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Enforcement Of The Clean Air And Clean Water
Acts
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I. INTRODUCTION
The regulatory systems mandated by the Clean Air Act and the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act' are now firmly established
and have generally survived judicial challenge. Having promulgated
and defended its regulations, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) can now be expected to devote increased attention to enforce-
ment activity.' The anticipated emphasis on enforcement raises cer-
tain questions concerning the role of civil and criminal penalties in
* David McN. Olds received a B.A. from Swarthmore College and an LL.B from Harvard
University. He is a partner with Reed Smith Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
** John C. Unkovic received a B.A. from Harvard University and a J.D. from the Univer-
sity of Michigan. He is a partner with Reed Smith Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh, Pennsyl-
vania.
*** Jeff L. Lewin received his B.A. from the University of Michigan and a J.D. from
Harvard University.
The authors acknowledge the important help in the preparation of this article supplied by
Maureen L. Atkinson, Celia J. Behrend, and Meredith B. Reynolds, all of whom are Parale-
gals with Reed Smith Shaw & McClay.
1. The EPA's general counsel has suggested that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA) be referred to as the Clean Water Act to parallel the Clean Air Act. 8 ENVI .
REP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 1987 (Apr. 21, 1978). This article will take a further step in the
direction of simplicity: for ease of presentation the FWPCA or Clean Water Act, as amended,
will be referred to as the Water Act, and the Clean Air Act, as amended, will be referred to
as the Air Act. Amending legislation will be referred to by its actual title.
2. In June of 1977 EPA enforcement personnel said that the Agency was "moving into a
new era of enforcement policy." 8 ENvR. RzP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 308 (June 24, 1977).
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securing compliance with environmental legislation. Initially, there
are the purely legal questions regarding the circumstances under
which civil and criminal penalties may be imposed and the persons
who can be subjected to such sanctions. Then there are questions
as to when each of these penalties ought, and ought not, to be
imposed and how they can best be fused to form a comprehensive
enforcement strategy that is fair, practical and effective in obtain-
ing compliance with the Air and Water Acts.
II. THE JUXTAPOSITION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES WITHIN
THE LEGISLATIVE SCHEME OF THE AIR AND WATER ACTS
A. Federal Regulation Prior to 1970
Despite the upsurge of environmental concern in the 1960's, at the
end of that decade there was still no centralized governmental con-
trol over industrial discharges. The Water Quality Control Act of
19653 and the Air Quality Act of 19671 took essentially supervisory
approaches to the problems of water and air pollution, placing pri-
mary emphasis on research, training, demonstration projects and
technical assistance. 5
Regarding direct control of pollution, the Water Quality Act of
1965, amending the FWPCA of 1958,6 required each State to estab-
lish water quality criteria and an appropriate implementation plan
applicable to interstate waters within the State, subject to federal
approval. The Air Quality Act of 1967 called for the issuance of
federal air quality criteria but required each State to establish re-
gional ambient air quality standards and a plan for their implemen-
tation, also subject to federal approval.
The states were given primary responsibility for enforcement of
the federally approved air and water criteria. The only provisions
for federal enforcement were abatement proceedings authorized in
certain limited situations.7 These procedures were rarely utilized for
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970).
5. The following summary of federal regulation of air and water pollution prior to 1970 is
based primarily upon 1 F. GRAD, TRATISE ON ENviRONMENTAL LAW § 2.01(1) (Air) and §
3.03(1)(a) (Water) (1977) [hereinafter cited as GRAD].
6. Pub. L. No. 845, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1115 (1948).
7. Federal abatement of pollution of interstate waters could be initiated after 180 days of
notice to the polluter or after a lengthy conference and hearing procedure. Interstate air
pollution was subject to abatement after a similar conference procedure or in emergency
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a variety of reasons, including the absence of approved state criteria
and implementation plans, the difficulty of establishing that a par-
ticular polluter was reducing air or water quality below applicable
standards and the cumbersome procedural prerequisites to abate-
ment proceedings. 8
A major event in the evolution of federal governmental pollution
control was the the "rediscovery" in 1970 of the Refuse Act of 1899.'
The Refuse Act makes it a crime to discharge any refuse matter into
the navigable waters of the United States without the permission of
the Army Corps of Engineers. The Refuse Act has consistently been
construed as a "strict liability" statute, imposing liability without
any showing of intent, knowledge or even negligence. 0 Thus, for
example, the owner of a vessel from which refuse was discharged was
convicted even though he did not know of the discharge and had
taken reasonable steps to prevent such discharges." Since the Corps
of Engineers, prior to 1970, had no program for the issuance of
permits to industrial sources of water pollution,"1 all industrial dis-
charges arguably constituted criminal violations of the Refuse Act.
The Refuse Act's proscription was not applied to industrial water
pollution until the late 1960's, however, because prior to that time
it was thought that the Act applied only to deposits of refuse which
impeded navigation and that industrial discharges fell under an
situations or where air quality had fallen below applicable standards and the State had failed
to take reasonable action to bring about abatement. If intrastate air pollution was involved,
federal abatement proceedings could be commenced at the request of the governor. See GRAD,
supra note 5, at § 2.03, pp 2-55-2-57 and § 3.03, pp 3-58-3-62.
8. Although the abatement remedy had existed under the FWPCA since 1948, as of 1972
there had been only one such judicial enforcement proceeding. GRAD, supra note 5, at
§ 3.03, pp 3-60--3-62; S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in (1972] U.S. COD
CONG. & AD. NEws 3668, 3672; Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective
Legislation, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1103 (1970); Note, The Refuse Act of 1899: New Tasks for an
Old Law, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 782, 784-85 (1971). The abatement proceedings applicable to air
pollution were also infrequently used and were viewed as rather extraordinary measures.
GRAD, supra note 5, at § 2.03, p. 2-55.
9. The "Refuse Act" is the popular name for § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropria-
tions Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1152, 33 U.S.C.A. § 407 (1970). See United States v. Pennsylvania
Industrial Chemical Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 658 n.5 (1973).
10. See cases cited in United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619, 622-24 (1st Cir.
1974). But see United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 230 (1966), which by reserving
the question suggested that it was not conclusively settled.
11. The President Coolidge, 101 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1939).
12. See Glenn, The Crime of "Pollution": The Role of Federal Water Pollution Criminal
Sanctions, 11 Am. CraM. L. REv. 835, 844-45 n.45 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Glenn].
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exemption for refuse matter "flowing from streets and sewers and
passing therefrom in a liquid state." The few reported cases prior
to 1965 which did not involve obstruction of navigation were based
upon dumping of wastes rather than discharge of industrial ef-
fluents. 3
In 1960 the Supreme Court, in United States v. Republic Steel
Corp.," ruled that the sewage exception was limited to domestic
sewage and did not immunize a corporation from liability for shoals
created by the deposit of suspended dust particles in its industrial
discharge. Then, in the 1966 case of United States v. Standard Oil
Co.,'5 the Supreme Court ruled that the Refuse Act applied to all
pollutants, not just those which caused navigation-impeding depos-
its.' The theoretical effect of these two cases was to transform the
Refuse Act into a blanket prohibition on all industrial water pollu-
tion.
Despite these decisions, however, the Act remained virtually dor-
mant until the 1970 Waters and Wetlands Report 7 called for the
vigorous prosecution of violators. Thereafter, prosecutors across the
country began to wield the sword of strict criminal liability in the
battle against water pollution." Commentators hailed the Refuse
Act and its strict liability approach as a promising new weapon in
the fight for clean water."9 Not surprisingly, however, the
13. E.g., United States v. Ballard Oil Co., 195 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1952), La Merced, 84 F.2d
444 (9th Cir. 1936).
14. 362 U.S. 482 (1960), rev'g 264 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1959).
15. 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
16. It has been suggested that the dictum in this case was overbroad and that the
petroleum-based refuse matter involved in this and the previous dumping cases did by itself
threaten navigation. See Comment, Discharging New Wine into Old Wineskins: The Meta-
morphosis of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. Prrr. L. Rzv. 483, 512-14 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Discharging New Wine].
17. H.R. REP. No. 917, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). See Discharging New Wine, supra note
16, at 486-90, for an account of how tl~e Refuse Act came to be rediscovered. There had,
however, been a few prosecutions of industrial polluters prior to the Waters and Wetlands
Report: e.g., United States v. United States Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ind. 1970),
aff'd, 482 F.2d 439 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 909 (1973); United States v. Interlake
Steel Corp., 297 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
18. Glenn, supra note 12, at 840-41, 851; Tripp and Hall, Federal Enforcement Under the
Refuse Act of 1899, 35 ALBANY L. REv. 60 n.1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Tripp & Hall]. See
cases cited in United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 671-72
(1973).
19. Rodgers, Industrial Water Pollution and the Refuse Act: A Second Chance for Water
Quality, 119 U. PA. L. Rzv. 761 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Rodgers]; Note, The Refuse Act:
Its Role Within the Scheme of Federal Water Quality Legislation, 46 N.Y. U. L. REV. 304
(1971); Comment, The Refuse Act of 1899: Its Scope and Role in Control of Water Pollution,
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"rediscovery" of the 1899 legislation and its application in a modem
industrial setting generated substantial confusion and engendered
a goodly amount of litigation."
Contemporaneously with the rediscovery of the Refuse Act there
was an increasing societal awareness that pollution was not so much
a wrongful act as an inevitable byproduct of an industrial culture.2
Viewed from this perspective, some commentators began to explore
the moral and legal justifications for the imposition of sanctions on
industry and local government bodies and to question whether crim-
inal sanctions should be employed at all in dealing with the problem
of pollution.22 With regard to pollution control, the criminal law was
characterized as "too blunt a weapon',"2 "cumbersome" and "not
well-suited to corporations and other business organizations." '
More fundamentally, it became clear that effective environmental
protection necessitated a more comprehensive and rational regula-
tory program than could be afforded by existing law or by use of
criminal prohibitions.
The absolute criminal prohibition of the rediscovered Refuse Act
was philosophically inconsistent with the permissive regulatory
scheme of the FWPCA, 6 but the former eventually provided a tool
for the latter's enforcement. In June of 1970 the Justice Department
issued its "Guidelines for Litigation Under the Refuse Act" which
stated that the Refuse Act would not be used for general pollution
58 CAL. L. Rv. 1444 (1970); Note, The Refuse Act of 1899: New Tasks for an Old Law, 22
HASr mNs L.J. 782 (1971); Tripp & Hall, supra note 18. But see Discharging New Wine, supra
note 16, criticizing the expansion of the Refuse Act as a "clear misconstruction of the stat-
ute."
20. See Glenn, supra note 12, at 844-45 n.45, and United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial
Chemical Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 659 n.9, 670-75 (1973), for a review of the events and the
confusion caused by the transformation.
21. At the culmination of a "weighty" discussion of environmental matters, Walt Kelly's
comic strip possum, Pogo, declared: "We have met the enemy, and he is us!"
22. See, e.g., Morris, Environmental Problems and the Use of Criminal Sanctions, 7
LwD & WATER Rav. 421, 429-31 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Morris]. See also Comment,
Criminal Responsibility of Corporate Officials for Pollution of the Environment, 37 AuAY
L. Ray. 61, 67 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Responsibility]; Kovel, A Case for Civil
Penalties: Air Pollution Control, 46 J. UAmA L. 153, 154 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Kovell.
But see Mix, The Misdemeanor Approach to Pollution Control, 10 ARtz. L. Ray. 90 (1968).
23. Kovel, supra note 22, at 154.
24. Laughran, The Law and The Corporate Polluter: Flexibility and the Adaption in the
Developing Law of the Environment, 23 MEncER L. REv. 571, 586 (1972); Krier, The Pollution
Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Overview, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 429,466 (1971).
25. Morris, supra note 22, at 429.
26. Discharging New Wine, supra note 16, at 521-22.
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abatement, but rather to aid enforcement of the FWPCA by punish-
ing both the "occasional or recalcitrant polluter" and "discharges,
which are either accidental or infrequent, but which are not of a
continuing nature." An attempt was then made to harmonize the
two statutes in the 1970 Executive Order which established the
Refuse Act permit program and made issuance of a permit contin-
gent upon compliance with FWPCA water quality standards.28 The
implementation of the Refuse Act permit program thus transformed
the Refuse Act "from a criminal statute into the cornerstone of a
major regulatory program."'
The intended ascendancy of regulation over criminalization with
regard to water pollution occurred simultaneously with the enact-
ment of a comprehensive scheme regulating air pollution in the 1970
amendments to the Clean Air Act.ss Then, after the Refuse Act
permit program foundered on the shoals of litigation,3' the 1972
FWPCA amendments 2 replaced it with a more detailed regulatory
program. Thus, while prior to 1970 there had been no truly effective
federal control over air and water pollution, by 1972 the Air and
Water Acts had been enacted with the intention of creating a com-
prehensive system of environmental regulation having broad en-
forcement provisions.
B. Civil and Criminal Sanctions Under the Air and Water Acts
The regulatory schemes established by the Air and Water Acts
for industrial and municipal sources of pollution, though quite dif-
ferent in many respects, share the broad approach of establishing
strict emission limitations for various pollutants pursuant to federal
27. 1 ENVR. RE.-Current Dev. (BNA) 288 (July 17, 1970). These guidelines were not
heeded by the United States Attorneys in several key industrial centers who initiated a series
of actions which were inconsistent with those guidelines. See, e.g, Glenn, supra note 12, at
851; United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 461 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1972),
rev'd 411 U.S. 655 (1973). It is thus open to question whether the federal government really
intended to adhere to the guidelines.
28. Exec. Order No. 11,574, 3 C.F.R. § 188 (1970). See the discussion in Glenn, supra note
12, at 841-44.
29. Glenn, supra note 12, at 845.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970).
31. See Glenn, supra note 12, at 852-54 on the demise of the Refuse Act permit program.
One of the major problems was the absence of a clear definition of the term "refuse" so that
neither prosecutors nor industry had clear guidelines as to which activities were proscribed.
':2. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).
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guidelines promulgated by the Administrator of the EPA.ss
Under the Air Act each State must develop, and the Administra-
tor must approve, a state implementation plan (SIP) which estab-
lishes emission limitations for stationary sources of air contami-
nants within geographical air quality control regions. Each SIP
must, at least theoretically, provide for the achievement of national
ambient air quality standards set by the Administrator for desig-
nated pollutants such as particulates and sulfur doxide.u
A permit system was the cornerstone of the 1972 amendments to
the Water Act which had as a goal the phasing out of all water
pollution (attain "no-discharge") by 1981. The 1972 amendments
created a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit program under which the permitee must conform
to specified effluent limitations based upon federally established
effluent limitation guidelinesss The permit system is federally ad-
ministered and enforced, but the Administrator may delegate the
federal authority to state-created permit programs which receive
the approval of the Administrator.
The enforcement provisions of the Air and Water Acts3 are now
substantially similar, the 1970 Clean Air Act amendments having
served as a model for the 1972 FWPCA amendments which in turn
served as a model for certain changes made by the 1977 Clean Air
Act amendments. Both Acts provide for federal and state enforce-
ment jurisdiction, 37 the EPA Administrator taking action only if the
polluter fails to abate, and the state fails to act, within 30 days after
both have been notified of the violation of a SIP emission standard
or a NPDES permit effluent limitation3s The Administrator then
33. This article focuses on the emission and effluent limitations applicable to industrial
and municipal sources of pollution under the Air and Water Acts. The discussion herein is
relevant, however, to the enforcement of other aspects of these Acts, such as the moving
source and ozone protection provisions of the Air Act and the oil and hazardous substances
and marine sanitation devices provisions of the Water Act.
34. See Air Act, §§ 105-114, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7405-7414 (Supp. 1978).
35. See Water Act, §§ 301-309, 316 and 331-332, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311-1319, 1326, and 1341-
1342 (Supp. 1978).
36. Air Act, § 113, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413 (Supp. 1978); Water Act, § 309, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319
(Supp. 1978).
37. Both Acts also permit citizen suits for enforcement. Air Act, § 304, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604
(Supp. 1978); Water Act, § 505, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365 (Supp. 1978).
38. One curious difference between the Air and Water Acts is that EPA enforcement
appears to be mandatory ("shall") under the Water Act, whereas under the Air Act it appears
to be discretionary ("may"; except since 1977 in the case of major stationary sources). The
Fifth Circuit has recently held, however, that despite the mandatory language of the Water
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has the option of either issuing a "compliance order" or proceeding
directly with a civil action for enforcement (i.e., injunctive relief
and civil penalties) in federal court. Violation of a compliance order
is itself subject to sanctions," so, in theory, a compliance order
should often obviate the need for court-ordered enforcement.
There are several significant differences between the penalty pro-
visions of the Air and Water Acts which are somewhat surprising in
view of the Acts' virtually identical enforcement procedures. Both
Acts provide for a criminal fine of up to $25,000 per day of violation
and/or imprisonment of up to one year, 0 but only the Water Act
specifies a minimum fine-$2,500 per day of violation. Both acts
provide criminal penalties for the violation of emission or effluent
standards, but only under the Air Act is it a crime to violate a
compliance order. The Acts have different scienter requirements:
the Air Act's criminal provisions apply to "knowing" violations,
whereas the Water Act punishes both "willful" and "negligent"
violations. Furthermore, the criminal provisions of the Air Act gen-
erally apply only to violations which continue after notice to the
defendant, while the Water Act permits criminal prosecutions with-
out any prior notification." Both Acts do share one identical provi-
sion, however: both attempt to protect the integrity of the reporting
and monitoring system underlying the enforcement process by pro-
viding a $10,000 fine and/or six months imprisonment for any person
who knowingly makes a false statement in any required document
or tampers with any required monitoring device. 2
Act, the Administrator retains discretion in its enforcement, both in the issuance of compli-
ance orders and in the initiation of litigation. Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.
1977). See also State Water Control Board v. Train, 559 F.2d 921, 927 (4th Cir. 1977), and
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657, 660 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 975
(1977), in which the courts recognized the existence of prosecutorial discretion under the
Water Act.
39. For violation of a compliance order, both criminal and civil penalties may be imposed
under the Air Act; under the Water Act, however, only civil penalties may be imposed.
40. An offense committed after a first conviction carries a fine of up to $50,000 and up to
two years imprisonment.
41. See notes 57-62 and accompanying text infra.
42. These criminal penalties would seem to be fully applicable to falsification of data by
government enforcement personnel inasmuch as under both acts the term "person" includes
any "individual", and in the Air Act it expressly includes government employees. Air Act, §
302(e), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7602(e) (Supp. 1978); Water Act, § 502(5), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362 (Supp.
1978). Cf. United States v. Moss-American, Inc., 11 ERC 1470 (E.D. Wisc. 1978), in which
the court dismissed the government's enforcement action when it was discovered that an EPA
investigator had intentionally mislabeled a water pollution sample.
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In addition to these criminal sanctions, the 1972 FWPCA amend-
ments contained a provision for "civil penalties" (with no knowl-
edge or negligence requirement) of up to $10,000 per day of violation
of either the Act or of a compliance order." Similar "civil penalties"
were incorporated in the 1977 amendments to the Air Act, except
that the ceiling was set at $25,000 per day of violation."
The 1977 Clean Air Act amendments also contain an entirely new
enforcement provision-the mandatory administrative noncompli-
ance penalty." The noncompliance penalty, which goes into effect
in July of 1979,46 represents an attempt to offset the possible eco-
nomic value of a delay in compliance by authorizing the State or
the Administrator to assess a penalty based on the capital and
operating costs "saved" by the polluter as a result of its noncompli-
ance. The noncompliance penalty purports to prevent a noncomply-
ing source from gaining a competitive advantage over sources al-
ready in compliance.' 7 The provision requires that the recipient of
a notice of violation calculate the amount of penalty owed within
45 days of such notice or the calculation will be made by the State
or the EPA Administrator. Failure to pay the noncompliance pen-
alty results in an additional penalty of 20% per quarter year on the
unpaid balance. The Administrator may commence a civil action to
recover the noncompliance penalty and nonpayment penalty.
In sum, the Air and Water Acts provide a broad panoply of civil
and criminal sanctions and vest great discretion in the hands of the
government agencies charged with their enforcement. The existence
of such a variety of enforcement options raises questions concerning
the circumstances under which each sanction is applicable and how
these sanctions can be molded into a comprehensive and effective
enforcement strategy which not only adheres to existing principles
of our legal system but also takes into account the conflicting reali-
ties present in an industrial culture faced with resource scarcity.
43. The distinction between criminal and civil penalties is discussed at length in text
accompanying notes 63-71 infra.
44. Pub. L. No. 95-95, Section 111(b), 91 Stat. 685, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413 (Supp. 1978).
45. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7420 (Supp. 1978).
46. The EPA is already incorporating the concept underlying the noncompliance penalty
in calculating its settlement demands in civil penalty actions brought pursuant to both the
Air and Water Acts. See text accompanying notes 98-105 infra.
47. H.R. Rm,. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1977] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1155.
48. E.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658,670-74 (1975); United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943). Among the many law review articles discussing strict criminal
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Ill. LEGAL CRITERIA GOVERNING IMPOSITION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
PENALTIES
A. Background: Regulatory Offenses and Strict Criminal Liability
A fundamental tenet of our jurisprudence is that common law
crimes require proof of the defendant's criminal intent as an ele-
ment of the offense. With the growth of government regulation in
the 20th century, however, Congress has created a number of
"regulatory offenses" which are punishable without regard to the
defendant's state of mind. These regulatory offenses are said to
create strict criminal liability, since the defendant may be punished
for such offenses without proof of intent or even of recklessness.
The Supreme Court has upheld the imposition of criminal sanc-
tions on a strict liability basis, without regard to the actor's
"consciousness of wrongdoing," in certain "regulatory offense" situ-
ations.'4 The rationale underlying strict criminal liability is that
persons who engage in certain regulated activities accept a duty to
achieve compliance with the applicable regulations." The Supreme
Court explained in United States v. Park:
[Tihe [Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic] Act imposes not
only a positive duty to seek out and remedy violations when
they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement mea-
sures that will insure that violations will not occur. The re-
quirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible
corporate agents are beyond question demanding, and perhaps
onerous, but they are no more stringent than the public has a
right to expect of those who voluntarily assume positions of
authority in business enterprises whose services and products
liability for regulatory offenses, see, e.g., Elkins, Corporations and the Criminal Law: An
Uneasy Alliance, 65 Ky. L.J. 73 (1976); Ball & Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in
the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. Rv. 197 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Ball & Friedman]; Kadish, Some Observations of the Use of Criminal
Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. Ctn. L. Rv. 423 (1963); Note, Increasing
Community Control Over Corporate Crime-A Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J.
280 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Increasing Community Control]; Wasserstrom, Strict Liabil-
ity in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. RHv. 731 (1960); Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law,
23 LAw & CoNTMPp. PROS. 401, 417-25 (1958); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLuM. L.
Rzv. 55 (1933).
49. See, e.g., Criminal Responsibility, supra note 22, at 94-95 (advocating imposition of
strict criminal liability in environmental protection legislation); Increasing Community Con-
trol, supra note 48, at 303-04.
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affect the health and well-being of the public that supports
them.-"
There remains a philosophical conflict between the common law
assumption that "consciousness of wrongdoing" is a prerequisite to
imposition of criminal liability and legislative attempts to dispense
with the state of mind requirement by enacting strict liability regu-
latory offenses. The Supreme Court's interpretation of strict crimi-
nal liability as applied to corporate officers has attempted to resolve
this conflict by equating strict liability with a negligence standard
of care: the officer is punished for violation of a duty of care owed
to the public. In United States v. Park5l the Court upheld the con-
viction, under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, of the
president of a supermarket chain which had shipped contaminated
food in interstate commerce. In its holding that the president could
be held liable without proof of conscious wrongdoing, the Court
emphasized that he had been notified of the sanitation problem and
was generally "responsible" for the conduct of the subordinates to
whom he delegated the task of correcting it. The Court explained:
The concept of a 'responsible relationship' to, or a 'responsible
share' in, a violation of the Act indeed imports some measure
of blameworthiness; but it is equally clear that the Government
establishes a prima facie case when it introduces evidence suf-
ficient to warrant a finding by the trier of the facts that the
defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation,
responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first in-
stance, or promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and
that he failed to do so. The failure thus to fulfill the duty
imposed by the interaction of the corporate agent's authority
and the statute furnishes a sufficient causal link. The consider-
ations which prompted the imposition of this duty, and the
scope of the duty, provide the measure of culpability.2
The dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart in the Park case most
clearly articulates the equivalence of strict liability and negligence.
The dissenters believed that the jury had not been adequately in-
50. 421 U.S. at 672.
51. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
52. Id. at 673-74.
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structed with regard to the president's "responsibility," but they
did not dispute the appropriateness of strict criminal liability:
As I understand the Court's opinion, it holds that in order
to sustain a conviction under § 301(k) of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act the prosecution must at least show
that by reason of an individual's corporate position and respon-
sibilities, he had a duty to use care to maintain the physical
integrity of the corporation's food products. A jury may then
draw the inference that when the food is found to be in such
condition as to violate the statute's prohibitions, that condition
was 'caused' by a breach of the standard of care imposed upon
the responsible official. This is the language of negligence, and
I agree with it.5
Strict criminal liability is truly "strict", however, where the de-
fendant is a corporation rather than an individual, since the concept
underlying regulatory offenses is that corporations may be held ac-
countable for the consequences of their operations regardless of the
fault of any of their employees. Nevertheless, a corporation can only
be held criminally liable where it (i.e., its employees) had sufficient
control to prevent the violation.54
Despite the arguable similarity between strict criminal liability
53. Id. at 678-79. Even assuming, however, that strict criminal liability can be philosophi-
cally equated with a negligence standard of proof, an assumption which warrants further
judicial consideration, there is constitutional doubt as to whether imprisonment or large
criminal fines may be imposed on individuals absent proof of knowledge. Thus, in United
States v. Corporation of the Era, 68 Cr. 903 (S.D. N.Y. September 29, 1969) (unpublished
opinion), the court held that the government must prove that an individual defendant knew
of the violation and was in a position to prevent it. See discussion in Criminal Responsibility,
supra note 22, at 78-80; Tripp & Hall, supra note 18, at 76. For a suggestion that severe
criminal penalties under a strict liability standard are unconstitutional, see Rosenthal,
FEDERAL POWER TO PRESERVE THE ENVIRONMENT: ENFORCEMENT AND CONTROL TECHNIQUES, in
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: PRIORITIES, PoucIs AND THE LAW 235 n.74 (F. Grad, A. Rathjens
and A. Rosenthal eds., 1971) [hereinafter cited as Rosenthal]. But see Dubin, Mens-Rea
Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. Rv.
322, 390-91 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Dubin], arguing that a "due diligence" standard
would satisfy due process. Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) and Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
54. In United States v. Georgetown University, 331 F. Supp. 69 (D.D.C. 1971), the district
court found the University not guilty of a violation of the Refuse Act on the grounds that it
was not in a position to prevent the oil spill which occurred during the testing of a newly-
installed power plant when a University employee turned on the pumps at the direction of a
mechanical contractor. The court held that the contractor, not the University, had "control"
of the power plant.
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and traditional negligence, it is clear that regulatory offense liability
may be imposed on the basis of conduct which many citizens would
not criticize. It has therefore been questioned whether it is appropri-
ate to attach the stigma of criminality to the nonblameworthy con-
duct of persons engaged in a socially beneficial enterprise. 5 Con-
versely, it has been suggested that criminal prosecution for regula-
tory offenses will not measurably improve compliance since juries
may hesitate to convict in the absence of a public perception of
moral wrongdoing, and a conviction even if obtained, would not
carry the real stigma of criminality.56 Such tendencies would be
magnified where the alleged violator on trial was an enterprise
which played an important role in the local economy.
Congress was no doubt aware of these concerns when, despite the
legacy of strict criminal liability under the Refuse Act, it chose to
make some element of wrongdoing a prerequisite to the imposition
of criminal penalties under the Air and Water Acts. On the other
hand, however, Congress retained strict liability in the "civil pen-
alty" provisions of those Acts. Criminal sanctions have thus been
reserved for situations in which the stigma of criminality is viewed
as more appropriate, while civil penalties are used to reinforce a
higher standard of care. Since the criminal and civil penalty provi-
sions of the Acts apply to different types of violations, different
problems will arise in their application.
B. Standards Governing Imposition of Criminal and Civil
Penalties Under the Air and Water Acts
1. Criminal Penalties
The Air and Water Acts both require a showing of some conscious-
ness of wrongdoing before criminal sanctions can be imposed. Nei-
ther purports to impose strict criminal liability. The Air Act pun-
55. See articles cited in notes 22 & 53 supra.
56. Comment, Criminal Liability Under the Refuse Act of 1899 and the Refuse Act Permit
Program, 63 J. CraIM. L. 366, 368 (1972); Criminal Responsibility, supra note 22, at 154.
In Criminal Responsibility, however, the author argues that "today pollution can almost
be classified as malum in se, something wrong in and of itself." Id. at 67. In any event, a
possible counter to the contention that no moral stigma is currently attached to pollution
"crimes" is that its proponents overlook the evolution of public consciousness produced by
the criminal sanctions themselves. See Ball & Friedman, supra note 48, at 200. See also
Glenn, supra note 12, at 857-58, arguing that enforcement of the Refuse Act "focused public
attention on the criminality of water pollution."
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ishes "knowing" violations while the Water Act penalizes either
"willful" or "negligent" violations. The legislative histories give no
indication as to why either of these standards of criminal liability
was chosen or why the two different standards were created.
An initial question is whether the "willfully or negligently" stan-
dard set forth in the 1972 FWPCA amendments is different in scope
from the "knowingly" standard of the 1970 Clean Air Act amend-
ments or whether it merely represents a clarification of the earlier
language. Although the legislative history is silent on this matter,
it would appear that these standards are distinct and that a higher
degree of culpability is a prerequisite to criminal liability under the
Air Act.
Section 2.02 of the American Law Institute's MODEL PENAL CODE
(Proposed Official Draft 1962) distinguishes among four states of
mind: purposely, knowingly, recklessly and negligently.57 On this
spectrum, an actor is "negligent" when the actor should have been
aware of certain facts if reasonable care had been taken, whereas
57. (2) Kinds of Culpability Defined.
(a) Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is
his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result;
and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the
existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circum-
stances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances
exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
(c) Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances
known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
(d) Negligently.
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he
should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists
or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, the
actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and
the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care
that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
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"knowing" conduct involves an actual awareness of the relevant
conduct, circumstances or results thereof.55 It thus seems apparent
that criminal liability may be imposed under the Water Act on a
lesser showing of culpability than under the Air Act.5"
The different mens rea requirements of the Air and Water Acts
correspond to the difference in the nature of the conduct for which
criminal sanctions may be imposed under each Act. Under the Air
Act the criminal penalties generally apply only where a violation
has continued after the defendant has received notice of the non-
compliance.6 0 A defendant "knowingly" violates the Air Act by fail-
ing to take appropriate action after having been notified of a viola-
tion. Under the Water Act, however, there are no provisions for
notification prior to the imposition of criminal penalties.61 Accord-
58. See United States v. Gallo, 543 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1976), holding that the crime of
transporting gold coins "knowing the same to have been stolen" is not established merely by
evidence that the defendant should have been put on notice that they were stolen. The court
noted, however, that a defendant could be convicted on circumstantial evidence that he
"must have known" the coins were stolen without direct proof that he actually possessed this
knowledge.
To establish a "knowing" violation the government need not prove that defendant specifiT
cally intended to violate the Air Act. See United States v. Ouelette, 11 ERC 1350 (E.D. Ark.
1978), holding that specific intent is not an element of the crime of "knowingly" making a
false statement under the Air Act.
59. See Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 309(c)(1), 86 Stat. 816 (1972). Since liability may be
imposed for even a negligent violation of the Water Act, it is unnecessary to define precisely
the degree of culpability necessary to find a "willful" violation. The term "willfulness" is
generally used, as it is in the Water Act, to contrast with the term "negligence", and willful-
ness has been deemed to encompass reckless, knowing or purposeful behavior, depending on
the context. See the various definitions set forth in BLACK'S LAw DiCvONARY (1968 ed.) and
in 45 WORDS AND PHRASES, "Willful; Willfully" (1970 and Supp. 1978).
The Supreme Court has recognized that the word may have different meanings according
to its context. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394-95 (1933). In the Internal Revenue
Code, for example, willfulness generally connotes "a voluntary intentional violation of a
known legal duty." United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976); United States v.
Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973). The intentional element of willfulness thus makes it more
akin to "purposeful" than to "knowing" among the definitions provided by the Model Penal
Code.
60. The most important criminal provisions under the Air Act apply to violation of a state
implementation plan more than 30 days after receipt of a notice of violation, violation of or
refusal to comply with a compliance order and failure to pay a noncompliance penalty, all of
which involve prior notice to the violator. Prior notification is not a prerequisite, however, to
penalties for violation of a state implementation plan during federally-assumed enforcement,
construction or operation of a new or modified source in violation of the new source standards
of performance, violation of a condition contained in an order suspending an applicable
emission limitation or violation of ozone regulations.
61. The Water Act criminal penalties apply to "Any person who willfully or negligently
violates section 301 [effluent limitations], 302 [water quality related effluent limitations],
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ingly, a defendant may be convicted under the Water Act not only
for a willful violation but also for negligently failing to prevent or
abate a violation. 2
2. Civil Penalties
As an alternative to the above-discussed criminal sanctions, the
Air and Water Acts contain provisions for "civil penalties" which
may be assessed against those who violate either the Acts or compli-
ance orders issued thereunder. Civil and criminal penalties have
traditionally been distinguished on the basis of their purpose: civil
penalties are "remedial" where as criminal penalties are
"punitive. ' '1 3 Even such severe sanctions as a 50% fraud penalty
under the Internal Revenue Code" or forfeiture and double damages
for customs violations65 have been deemed remedial rather than
punitive on the ground that such penalties are not unreasonable or
excessive and serve to reimburse the Government for enforcement
expenses or other costs generated by the violation. The Supreme
Court has stated that the question of whether a given penalty is
civil/remedial or criminal/punitive is a matter of statutory construc-
tion.6
The principal practical distinction between civil and criminal
penalties is that the procedural safeguards of criminal due process,
including trial by jury and the burden of overcoming the presump-
tion of innocence by proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, are
absent in civil penalty proceedings. Also, the government can ob-
tain discovery from the defendant in in a civil penalty proceedings . 7
306 [national standards of performance], 307 [toxic and pretreatment effluent standards]
or 308 [inspections, monitoring and entry] of this title, or any permit condition or limitation
implementing any of such sections in a permit. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 309(c)(1), 86 Stat.
816 (1972).
62. The legislative history does not reveal whether Congress imposed this greater duty of
care under the Water Act because it viewed water pollution as a more urgent problem or
because it deemed industry to be more capable of monitoring its fluid effluents than its
gaseous emissions. Perhaps the inclusion of the negligence standard in the Water Act reflects
a Congressional reluctance to abandon the strict liability approach of the Refuse Act.
63. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972); Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398-401 (1938). See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 164-
65 (1963).
64. Helvering, 303 U.S. at 398-401.
65. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 237.
66. Id. Helvering, 303 U.S. at 399.
67. Id. at 402-04. See Kovel, supra note 22, at 156-58 for a procedural comparison of civil
and criminal penalty proceedings.
Vol. 17: 1
The Role of Penalties
Also, the government can obtain discovery from the defendant in a
civil penalty proceeding and can appeal from an adverse judgment.
Thus, it is far easier for the government to prevail in a civil penalty
proceeding than in a criminal trial.
Apart from these procedural differences, the primary distinction
between the civil and criminal penalty provisions of the Air and
Water Acts is that the civil penalties may be imposed without re-
gard to the actor's knowledge or negligence."8 These provisions rep-
resent a compromise between the proponents and critics of strict
criminal liability. Strict liability is retained, but in a non criminal
context, without the dual threats of imprisonment and moral
stigma; on the other hand, the absence of criminal procedural safe-
guards, coupled with the "preponderance of the evidence" standard
of proof, facilitates imposition of the civil penalties.
Indeed, it can be argued that the "civil" penalties of the Air and
Water Acts do not differ substantially from criminal penalties but
are merely labeled "civil" to circumvent the obstacles to conviction
in criminal proceedings.
There is a substantial body of Supreme Court authority concern-
ing the question of how to determine whether a particular sanction
is civil or criminal," and those decisions can be interpreted as negat-
ing the argument that the civil penalties of the Air and Water Acts
are really criminal in nature. The fact that these sanctions are de-
nominated "civil penalties" and co-exist with "criminal penalties"
under a regulatory scheme has been held to be virtually conclusive
evidence that Congress intended a non-criminal sanction. 0 That
Congress expressly provided a civil procedure for collection of the
penalty under the Air Act is also indicative of such an intent.7 The
Supreme Court decisions permit a civil penalty to have a punitive
aspect so long as it is primarily regulatory and is not excessive.
The legislative history does suggest a remedial purpose underly-
ing the civil penalty provisions of the Air and Water Acts: to render
noncompliance more costly than investment in pollution control
68. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 70-71, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CoDE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1148-49.
69. E.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603 (1959); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1957). These decisions are discussed in Kovel,
supra note 22, at 159-62.
70. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 236; Helvering, 303 U.S. at 404-05; Kovel,
supra note 22, at 159-62.
71. Helvering, 303 U.S. at 402.
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technology." In this regard, the new "noncompliance penalty"
under the Air Act is most clearly remedial inasmuch as it is calcu-
lated on the basis of the cost of compliance and is intended to
remedy any alleged competitive disadvantage suffered by sources
which promptly comply with the Act.
However, the civil penalty provisions of the Air and Water Acts
differ in several relevant respects from those approved by the Su-
preme Court in other contexts. Unlike the 50% tax fraud penalty or
the forfeiture and double damages for customs violations, the civil
penalties under the Air and Water Acts are not directly based on
the magnitude of the violation and hence cannot be characterized
as remedial in that sense, nor are the penalties in any way linked
to the cost of enforcement. In fact, the Water Act provides no guid-
ance in the assessment of civil penalties, and the criteria set forth
in the Air Act are not essentially remedial in nature.3 The potential
magnitude of these civil penalties-up to $10,000 or $25,000 per
day-further suggests that they are essentially punitive, not reme-
dial. It is also arguable that provision of civil penalties for violation
of a compliance order is a punitive sanction.7 There are, in short,
substantial arguments that the civil sanctions contained in the Air
and Water Acts are, in fact, criminal, but in light of existing pre-
cedent, it is by no means certain that these arguments will be
adopted by the courts.75
72. "Since the committee viewed the civil penalty as primarily remedial in purpose, the
committee also intends that the penalty be assessed in amounts which are adequate to assure
compliance will result, rather than permitting continued noncompliance to be economically
profitable." H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 70, reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1148 (regarding the amendment of the Air Act which added civil penalty provi-
sions).
73. Under the Air Act, the penalty is to take into account "the size of the business, the
economic impact of the penalty on the business, and the seriousness of the violation." Even
the third factor is not truly remedial in that it is supposed to reflect "the degree to which
any emission limit was exceeded and the duration and frequency of any such violation, rather
than its air quality impact or its direct adverse health effects." H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 69-70, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Con CONG. & AD. NEWS 1147-48.
74. However, the recipient of a compliance order faced with the prospect of a daily penalty
for disobedience is in a position comparable to that of a litigant under a civil contempt order
which provides a daily fine for noncompliance, and it is well settled that a prospective daily
fine for contempt is civil/remedial, not criminal/punitive. Shillitani v. United States, 384
U.S. 364 (1966); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 302-04 (1947); United
States v. Spectro Foods Corp., 544 F.2d 1175, 1178 (3d Cir. 1976).
75. The manner in which these penalties are assessed may influence a court's decision as
to whether they serve a punitive rather than a remedial function. The EPA has announced
that in settling enforcement actions it will request civil penalties calculated on the basis of
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Assuming, arguendo, that the civil penalties under the Air and
Water Acts will not be considered criminal sanctions, there remains
the question of the situations in which such penalties would be
appropriate. In discussing the civil penalty provisions which were
added to the Air Act in 1977, the House Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee cited several Supreme Court authorities
upholding strict criminal liability, stating that the rationale of those
cases was intended to apply to enforcement of the Air Act.7" Quoting
from United States v. Park, the Report declared that the Air Act
civil penalties should apply in cases of neglect where the law re-
quires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty,77 explaining:
In cases like assembly line errors in production of automo-
biles, the accidental contamination of unleaded gasoline, the
malfunction of a pollution control device, violations of emission
limitations or other pollution control requirements may occur.
The result is some increase in the risk to the public's health or
well-being, even if the degree of the increase in risk is unquanti-
fiable or unable to be proved. It matters not whether the viola-
tion was knowing as far as its effect on the public is concerned.
In many instances, proper quality control, maintenance,
inspection, monitoring, repair, personnel tests, or other mea-
sures can prevent or minimize the likelihood of such accidental
violations. The omission or inadequate execution of such pro-
phylactic measures would be a proper basis for enforcement
four factors: the economic benefit from delayed compliance, the harm to the environment,
the degree of the violator's recalcitrance and the amount of extraordinary enforcement costs.
Only the recalcitrance element is punitive in nature; the other three factors are properly
remedial. See text accompanying notes 103-109 infra. Moreover, courts which have considered
the penalty provision of the Water Act applicable to oil spills, § 311, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321
(Supp. 1978), have thus far rejected arguments that it is in effect a criminal sanction to which
criminal procedural safeguards apply. United States v. Le Beouf Bros. Towing Co., 537 F.2d
149, 152 (5th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 987 (1977); Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. United
States, 436 F. Supp. 907, 924-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
429 F. Supp. 830, 834-38 (E.D. Pa. 1977); United States v. General Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp.
1151, 1157-63 (D. Conn. 1975). But see Rosenthal, supra note 53, at 237, who remarks,
"Nevertheless, there can never be assurance that a sanction so nearly criminal in all but name
will not be so regarded by the Courts."
76. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 71, reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1149. This portion of the legislative history gives support to the contention that
the Acts' civil penalties are in reality criminal, because Congress admittedly was applying
established criminal principles with punitive overtones to penalties which it labeled as
"civil."
77. Id.
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under Title I or Title II of the act (as appropriate) just as surely
as an intentional violation.1 8
The Report thus suggests that although a purely accidental viola-
tion could provide a basis for imposition of civil penalties, enforce-
ment would only be appropriate where the violation could be attrib-
uted to some identifiable omission or mistake. It would appear that
civil liability can only be imposed on a person who was in a position
to prevent or abate the violation, and not where the violation was
the result of actions by third parties or an "act of God."7
C. Liability of the Corporation and Its Employees
1. Civil and Criminal Corporate Liability
Corporations may be held liable under the Air and Water Acts for
both civil and criminal penalties. Since a corporation is an artificial
legal entity which can act only through its agents, the question
arises as to whose acts may provide a basis for corporate liability.
In particular, where criminal liability is conditioned on negligent
(Water Act) or knowing (Air Act) conduct, it is unclear under what
circumstances a corporation may be held liable.
Civil penalties present no such problems of attribution, since con-
sciousness of wrongdoing is not a prerequisite to their imposition.
Strict civil liability appears to be particularly appropriate in the
case of a corporate defendant precisely because it is a nonsentient
entity. As with strict tort liability, the corporation is held accounta-
ble to the public for its injurious conduct regardless of the state of
mind of the employees involved.
. The Acts' criminal sanctions do, however, raise the question of
whose culpability will be attributed to a corporate defendant, for
the corporation itself cannot act "negligently" or "knowingly." In
interpreting federal regulatory statutes imposing corporate criminal
78. Id.
79. See United States v. Georgetown University, 331 F. Supp. 69 (D.D.C. 1971), where
the university was found not guilty of a criminal violation of the Refuse Act where the
violation was caused by the actions of a subcontractor and could not have been prevented by
the University. But see two cases in which courts held that inability to prevent an oil spill
caused by a third party was not a defense to civil penalties under the Water Act, but merely
provided a basis for mitigation of those penalties: Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. United States,
436 F. Suplp. 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (remand to Coast Guard to reconsider penalty for barge
owner where oil spill caused by towing tugboat); General Motors Corp. v. United States, 403
F. Supp. 1151 (D. Conn. 1975) ($1 penalty imposed where oil spill caused by vandals).
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liability for "knowing" violations, the weight of modern authority
holds it to be sufficient that the requisite knowledge was possessed
by any corporate employee or agent acting within the scope of his
employment.8" As Judge Magruder, concurring in St. Johnsbury
Trucking Co. v. United States, explained:
In other words, in applying to a corporation an Act of Congress
punishing 'whoever knowingly' does something, it is usually
held to be enough to charge the corporation with guilt if any
agent or servant of the corporation, acting for the corporation
in the scope of his employment, has the guilty knowledge, in
accordance with the general principles of the law of agency as
applied in determining civil liability. . . On this view, it
would not be enough to absolve the corporation from liability
for a criminal offense of the sort here in question, that no mem-
ber of the board of directors, or no one of the higher executives,
knew that a dangerous commodity was being transported by
the company truck in a forbidden quantity without the mark-
ings required by the regulation. Nor would it be enough that
the higher executives of the corporation, as the defendant
sought to show here, took the utmost care to lay down for the
guidance of the subordinate employees procedures designed to
assure compliance with the regulation."'
The rule attributing the mens rea to the employee of the corporate
employer leads to harsh, and perhaps unjustifiable, results. Thus,
for example, in United States v. Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc., the
corporation was found guilty of leaving unattended a truck contain-
ing certain explosives, even though the driver of the truck had spe-
cifically been instructed to remain with the vehicle at all times. The
knowing act by the employee was sufficient to have the corporation
convicted of a knowing violation. So, also, in United States v. Little
Rock Sewer Committee,2 the Sewer Committee was convicted of
80. See, e.g., United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 126 (1958); United States
v. Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc., 464 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Chicago
Express, Inc., 273 F.2d 751, 753 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d
342, 343 (3d Cir. 1948); United States v. George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 328 U.S. 869 (1946); Boston & Maine R.R. v. United States, 117 F.2d 428, 431
(1st Cir. 1941).
81. 220 F.2d 393, 398 (1st Cir. 1955) (Magruder, J., concurring).
82. 11 ERC 1376 (E.D. Ark. 1978). The plant superintendent who submitted the falsified
report was also convicted of this offense. United States v. Ouelette, 11 ERC 1350 (E.D. Ark.
1978).
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"knowingly" submitting false information to the EPA despite the
absence of any allegation that the members of the Committee had
knowledge that the plant superintendent had falsified the report in
question.
When applied to a corporate defendant, the "knowing" or
"negligent" standards of criminal liability under the Air and Water
Acts will thus depend upon the mental state of any of the employees
in any way associated with the conduct in question. To hold the
corporation liable even where the directors and manager made a
good faith effort to comply and even where the misconduct was
committed by a nonmanagerial employee, in violation of company
policy would, in effect, subject a corporation to strict criminal liabil-
ity despite the statutory indication that a defendant's knowledge or
negligence is an element of the offense. Inasmuch as the individual
employees can be criminally punished, and the corporation is sub-
ject to civil penalties on a strict liability basis, it is neither necessary
nor equitable to impose the additional criminal stigma and penal-
ties on a nonculpable corporate employer.
2. Civil and Criminal Liability of Corporate Employees
The civil and criminal penalty provisions of the Air and Water
Acts apply to "any person" who commits a violation, and this would
include individual corporate employees . 3 Accordingly, individuals
as well as corporations may be subject to civil and criminal liability
under the Acts.
The criminal penalty provision of the Air Act was amended in
1977 to provide expressly that the term "person" includes any
"responsible corporate officer." 4 The amendment, incorporating
identical language from the criminal penalty provision of the Water
Act, reflects a special concern with prosecution of the individuals
responsible for violations, but it does not restrict the general defini-
tion of the word "person" which still includes any "individual."
The express designation of corporate officers as persons who could
be subject to criminal penalties was not a prerequisite to their being
held liable under the Air and Water Acts. For example, despite the
absence of a similar phrase in the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
83. See Air Act, § 302(e), 42 U.$.C.A. § 7602(e) (Supp. 1978); Water Act, § 352(e), 33
U.S.C.A. § 1362(5) (Supp. 1978).
84. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 111(d)(3), 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
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Act, the Supreme Court held that a corporate officer could be prose-
cuted thereunder for introduction of misbranded drugs into inter-
state commerce.85 In a later case the Court explained that the stat-
ute imposed liability on any corporate officer who had a
"responsible relationship" or a "responsible share" in the violation
if he "had by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility
and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to
correct, the violation. '6 In declaring that criminal liability under
the Air and Water Acts extends to a "responsible corporate officer,"
Congress simply codified current case law, eliminating any doubt
that corporate officers could be prosecuted for violations in which
they did not physically participate.
Unlike the corporations they serve, corporate officials cannot be
deemed vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior
for the acts of subordinate employees. Accordingly, corporate em-
ployees can only be convicted of a criminal violation where they
themselves possess the requisite mens rea: knowledge or negligence.
Thus, neither the president nor the plant manager of a company can
be held responsible for the criminal conduct of other employees
unless they themselves approved of the unlawful conduct or know-
ingly or negligently failed to prevent it.
Consciousness of wrongdoing is not a prerequisite to imposition
of civil penalties, but is unclear under what circumstances civil
penalties would apply to individuals. Congress apparently intended
that the penalties be imposed primarily upon "pollution sources"
but it also indicated that they would apply to "persons who own or
operate pollution sources." ' Neither the statutes nor their legisla-
tive histories suggest that "responsible corporate officers" should be
subjected to civil liability for violations committed by persons under
their control. Inasmuch as the civil penalties are supposed to be
remedial rather than punitive, they presumably should be assessed
against the business entities responsible for the violation rather
than against their employees. Nevertheless, there is nothing in the
Air and Water Acts which explicitly precludes imposition of civil
85. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). Compare the majority and dissent-
ing opinions.
86. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 668, 673-74 (1975). This definition presents no clear
guideline as to who is "responsible" in terms of liability, and it gives no clear guidelines as
to which officer is "more" responsible if more than one are arguably responsible.
87. H.R.REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sees. 69-70, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1147-48.
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penalties against corporate employees who were personally involved
in corporate activity which violated those Acts.
IV. THE ROLE OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES IN ENFORCEMENT
STRATEGY
A. The Need for a Comprehensive Enforcement Strategy
As is apparent from the foregoing discussion, both the EPA and
state enforcement agencies possess broad discretion in enforcing the
Air and Water Acts. When confronted with evidence of a violation
these agencies will be required to decide whether to seek civil or
criminal penalties and whether to proceed against the corporation
or its employees. The fact that each State may have a different
scheme of available civil and criminal penalties and may adopt its
own approach to enforcement increases the difficulty of developing
a consistent nationwide enforcement strategy under the Air and
Water Acts.
In addition to the uncertainty inherently associated with the ex-
istence of prosecutorial discretion, there is the confusion created by
ambiguity in the Air and Water Acts themselves. For example, the
Acts would seem to permit a corporation to be held criminally liable
on the basis of a negligent or knowing violation by a non-managerial
employee in situations where common sense would dictate that only
the employee and not the corporation merited punishment. Like-
wise, the Acts would seem to authorize imposition of civil penalties
on any corporate employees whose acts were related to, or who had
direct authority over, the events which were the basis of the alleged
violations.
More generally, given the "technology-forcing" deadlines and
limitations established by the Air and Water Acts,"8 many compa-
88. The Air Act is "technology-forcing" in that economic and technological infeasibility
may not be considered by the Administrator or the courts in evaluating a state implementa-
tion plan; sources unable to comply with the plan are, theoretically, expected to cease opera-
tions. Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 265 (1976). The Water Act is "technology-
forcing" in that the July 1, 1977 deadline for achieving effluent limitations is inflexible and
may not be extended even when compliance is not feasible. State Water Control Board v.
Train, 559 F.2d 921, 924-27 (4th Cir. 1977); United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 559 F.2d 921,
924-27 (4th Cir. 1977); United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 854-55 (7th Cir.
1977); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657, 660-63 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 975 (1§77). Although the 1977 amendments to the Air and Water Acts have provided
increased flexibility under certain special circumstances, there will still be many situations
in which a corporation will be unable to obtain a variance or extension.
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nies will not be in complete compliance with the applicable emis-
sion and effluent limitations, and given the Acts' reporting require-
ments, the companies will often know that they are in violation.
Theoretically, each of these companies and their employees would
be liable for daily civil and criminal penalties once they became
aware of the noncompliance. Furthermore, the civil penalty provi-
sions invite abuse in that they could be used punitively as substi-
tutes for criminal penalties whenever the enforcement agency
wishes to circumvent the procedural safeguards of a criminal trial
or to avoid the necessity of proving knowledge or negligence.
The uncertainty engendered by the range of possible sanctions
will be most acutely experienced by the corporate employee whose
company is technologically, economically or physically incapable of
attaining a mandated level of emissions or effluents by the applica-
ble deadline-a situation which may frequently arise. Indeed, as a
practical matter, those corporations which are most diligent in their
abatement programs but which cannot yet achieve abatement, may
be the ones most exposed to the gamut of civil and criminal sanc-
tions. Since "knowing" violations are subject to criminal sanctions
under both acts, a corporate officer aware of the noncompliance of
his plant would thus confront the unpleasant dilemma of ceasing
operations or risking criminal as well as civil penalties for himself
as well as for the corporation and other employees. 9
Unless a uniform enforcement strategy is developed, it is likely
that the government's broad discretion under the Acts will generate
a great deal of uncertainty, which will result in both unfairness to
the parties and delay in attainment of the desired levels of air and
water quality. A particular violation of an emission or effluent limi-
tation might be dealt with by a compliance order in one jurisdiction,
civil penalties in a second and criminal prosecution in a third. In
one case the corporation may be the target while in another jurisdic-
tion, on similar facts, the enforcement agency may proceed against
89. It is unclear whether economic or technical infeasibility will even be available as
defenses in criminal prosecutions. See Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. at 268 n.18, which,
though not addressing the question, cited two cases indicating that these defenses may be
available in enforcement proceedings. Cf. Commonwealth of Pennsylania, Department of
Environmental Resources v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 461 Pa. 675, 337 A.2d 823 (1975),
upholding denial of a petition for contempt because, given the technological impossibility of
compliance with the court-ordered abatement schedule, there was no willful disobedience of
the court's order. But see H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 68, reprinted in [1977]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1146.
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corporate employees. The unfairness of nonuniformity would be
exacerbated by the possible competitive advantage obtained by
sources subject to less vigorous enforcement. Moreover, one may
expect that unevenness in enforcement will produce unevenness in
compliance, retarding the attainment of the environmental stan-
dards in some regions while producing unnecessary and economi-
cally devastating plant closing in others.
B. Current Enforcement Policy
Although no single comprehensive enforcement policy statement
has been issued by the EPA, the broad outlines of such a policy have
been set forth in a series of speeches and memoranda emanating
from upper-echelon EPA enforcement personnel. If properly imple-
mented, this policy should generally achieve some degree of uni-
formity, although it leaves several questions unresolved and ulti-
mately relies on the good sense and good faith of the enforcement
personnel. 0
All indications are that the EPA will use the criminal sanctions
sparingly and only in exceptional cases. The chief of the Justice
Department's land and natural resources division has stated that
criminal convictions will be sought for "willful, substantial viola-
tions of the pollution laws of a criminal nature," with special em-
phasis on surreptitious dumpings and false reporting.' An Assistant
Attorney General likewise has stated that criminal enforcement will
focus on disposal and reporting violations,12 and has emphasized
that the government will not adopt "a frivolous attitude toward the
criminal law, nor one that strains to press the law to the outer
limits." The primary targets will be willful or repeated offenders
who substantialy exceed effluent or emission standards. 3
90. Uniform implementation is more easily proposed than effected. See, e.g., note 27
supra.
91. 8 ENVIR. REP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 1649, 1650 (Feb. 24, 1978), reporting a speech by
Assistant Attorney General James W. Moorman to the District of Columbia Bar Association
on February 21, 1978.
92. 8 ENvIR. REP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 2052 (Apr. 28, 1978), reporting a speech by Assist-
ant Attorney General Angus MacBeth to the ABA National Conference on the Environment
on April 22, 1978.
93. Reserving criminal sanctions for substantial violations should reduce the incentive for
either party. to alter date in a marginal case and lessen the chances of a conviction being based
upon inaccurate or falsified data. Cf., e.g., United States v. Moss-American, Inc., 11 ERC
1470 (E.D. Wisc. 1978), wherein the court dismissed the government's abatement action
because an EPA employee had intentionally falsified evidence.
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A memorandum from the assistant administrator for enforcement
concerning priorities for enforcement of the Water Act's July 1, 1977
deadlines stated that criminal prosecutions should be initiated
"where the authority of the Agency has been intentionally and de-
liberately flouted, and in other cases as appropriate."9 This memo-
randum also recommended that prosecution of individual corporate
officers "should be pursued only where the evidence demonstrates
that intentional corporate noncompliance with the law is the result
of an informed policy decision made by such corporate officials." 5
Likewise, under the Air Act, a draft memorandum sent last year to
Regional Enforcement Division Directors advised that criminal ac-
tion should be undertaken "where criminal conduct (i.e., knowing
and willful violation) can readily be proven" (emphasis added).9
Thus, although criminal liability can be imposed for a "knowing"
violation of the Water Act, the EPA has indicated its intent to
reserve sanctions for deliberate and "purposeful" violations.
The current pattern of criminal prosecutions is consistent with
the announced policy of restraint. As of April, 1978 the Justice
Department had pending only five or six criminal cases under the
Air Act and ten to twelve cases under the Water Act with another
one hundred possible Water Act cases under consideration pursuant
to referral from the Corps of Engineers. 7 It thus appears that crimi-
nal sanctions are being reserved for exceptional cases and will not
play a major role in the day-to-day policing of the emission and
effluent limitations of the Air and Water Acts.
In contrast to the limited use of criminal sanctions, the EPA
94. 8 ENvil. REP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 247-48 (June 10, 1977).
95. Id. The memorandum does not indicate whether criminal sanctions against corpora-
tions will likewise be limited to situations in which a violation was the result of an informed
policy decision. Although a corporation can theoretically be held criminally liable for viola-
tions caused by the knowing misconduct of lower-echelon employees, the tenor of the EPA's
enforcement memoranda suggests that it will not pursue criminal penalties unless managerial
personnel are directly responsible for the violation.
96. 8 ENVIR. bPP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 764, 766 (Sept. 16, 1977).
97. 8 ENVIR. REP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 2052 (Apr. 28, 1978). One recent example of the
type of case in which criminal charges have been brought was the March 23, 1978 indictment
of Olin Corporation and three former officials on charges of filing false reports which allegedly
grossly understated the amount of the company's mercury discharges. 8 ENVm. R.-Current
Dev. (BNA) 1861 (March 31, 1978). Cf. the 28- 12 to 58-12 month jail term given to the
president of a firm by a Pennsylvania court for dumping highly flammable solvents into a
sewer line, discussed in 8 ENVIR. REp.-Current Dev. (BNA) 2058 (Apr. 28, 1978). It is not
known whether charges will be brought against the government employee who falsified data
in the case of United States v. Moss-American, Inc. See note 82 supra.
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appears to be placing increasing reliance on "civil" penalties in the
enforcement of the Air and Water Acts. 8 In a 1977 memorandum
concerning enforcement priorities under the Water Act, the EPA's
assistant administrator for enforcement indicated that three reme-
dies would be sought in actions based on violation of the July 1, 1977
deadlines: "Substantial penalties for noncompliance, a court-
imposed compliance schedule, and even more severe penalties if the
court's schedule is violated . . . . [P]enalties can be an effective
counterweight to make delayed compliance a less economically at-
tractive alternative than timely compliance."" Shortly thereafter,
the deputy administrator for enforcement stated that the key fea-
ture of enforcement would be penalty structure "based on the eco-
nomic benefit of non-compliance."''0 On April 11, 1978 the EPA's
assistant administrator for enforcement issued a lengthy memoran-
dum entitled "Civil Penalty Policy-Certain Air and Water Act
Violators,"'' the preamble of which declares: "The objective of this
civil penalty policy is to assist in accomplishing the goals of environ-
mental laws by deterring violations and encouraging voluntary com-
pliance."'' 2 The April 11 memorandum recites that the civil penalty
policy "is based primarily upon four considerations-the harm done
to the public health or the environment; the economic benefit
gained by the violator; the degree of recalcitrance of the violator;
and any unusual or extraordinary enforcement costs thrust upon the
public."'' 0 3 Among these four factors, the memorandum places pri-
mary emphasis on the economic benefit gained by the violator, in
effect incorporating the Air Act's mandatory administrative non--
compliance penalty under the civil penalty provisions of both the
Air and Water Acts. °'0 The civil penalty applies to violations after
98. The EPA's recent policy statements regarding civil enforcement actions assume that
the civil sanctions are truly civil and are not criminal in nature. As suggested above, this
assumption may not be warranted.
99. 8 ENvm. RFP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 247, 248 (June 10, 1977).
100. 8 ENvm. REP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 308 (June 24, 1977).
101. 8 ENrIm. REP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 2011 (April 21, 1978). The policy is intended for
use by federal, state and local officials in furtherance of the goal of national consistency.
102. Id. at 2012.
103. Id. Mitigating factors which may reduce the penalty include delays caused by the
government and impossibility "attributable to causes absolutely beyond the control of the
violator (such as floods, fires or other acts of nature.)" Id. at 2015-16. Since good faith efforts
to obey the law are expected of all, "good faith" is not a mitigating circumstance.
104. The Administrator is thus circumventing a Congressional dec.aion not to impose a
noncompliance fee under the Water Act. Such a provision had been included in the Senate
version of the 1977 amendments to the Water Act, S. 1952, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 319 (1977),
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August 7, 1977 under the Air Act and after July 1, 1977 under the
Water Act.105 Calculations of the economic benefits attributable to
delayed capital expenditures and avoided operation and mainte-
nance expenses are to be combined in a single formula which will
be "forwarded shortly."
The memorandum gives little guidance on the calculation of the
other three elements of the civil penalty. With regard to the harm
to health and the environment, it simply suggests that "estimated
costs of environmental restoration," "traditional personal injury
damage concepts" and "recreational values developed by various
public agencies" may be helpful, but none of these will be of much
use in computing the marginal costs associated with one among
many polluters. The memorandum provides no guidance as to the
size of the sum which should reflect a given degree of recalcitr-
ance.' °0 And the element of extraordinary enforcement costs, while
straightforward, may not have widespread applicability. In sum, the
computation of civil penalties under the Air and Water Acts will
essentially involve a calculation of the economic benefit/non-
compliance penalty factors, increased by arbitrarily determined
amounts reflecting the magnitude of the violation and the recalcitr-
ance of the polluter.
The April 11 memo further states that the goal of an enforcement
action should be both compliance and penalties, but declares that
these two goals "should not be in any way traded off against each
other . . . . [E]nforcement officials should not bargain for compli-
but not in the House of Representatives version. H.R. 3199, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). No
comparable provision emerged from the Conference Committee. See 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4470-71.
. The civil penalties differ from mandatory noncompliance penalties in that they are assessed
by the court at the request of the Administrator, rather than by the Administrator in the first
stance. Since Congress provided no guidance in the calculation of regular civil penalties, the
Administrator appears to be justified in requesting penalties based on the economic benefit
of noncompliance.
105. To avoid double-counting, the economic benefit element of the civil penalty will,
according to the April 11 memorandum, cease to be applied under the Air Act once the
mandatory administrative noncompliance penalties go into effect in 1979. 8 ENVIR.
REP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 2013 (April 11, 1978).
106. Although the memorandum states that good faith challenges to administrative ac-
tion will not be deemed evidence of recalcitrance, it also notes that litigation will not extend
any deadlines or toll the penalties. Thus, where a deadline has passed during proceedings
concerning the validity of a particular provision, the litigant will be liable for civil penalties
if it either does not prevail on its challenge or fails to obtain a supercedes or stay. Train v.
National Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 92 (1975) (Air Act); United States Steel
Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 847-48 (7th Cir. 1977) (Water Act).
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ance (or interim controls) by offering any reduction in penalties."'' 7
The memorandum does, however, authorize enforcement officials to
give a "credit against penalty" where the violator agrees to make
"expenditures for environmentally beneficial purposes above and
beyond expenditures made to comply with all existing legal require-
ments"''0 (emphasis added). This creative innovation may alleviate
the concern that economic penalties could deprive companies or
municipalities of the funds necessary for investment in pollution
control equipment.' 9
One question not addressed by the EPA is the appropriateness of
civil penalties for corporate employees; indeed, the EPA has given
no indication whether it will seek civil penalties from individuals.
Thus, there are no guidelines for individuals in this important area.
Another question which is not directly addressed in the EPA's
current enforcement policy is what sanctions will be applied in the
case of a corporation which, for economic or technological' reasons,
is unable to comply with the applicable emission or effluent limita-
tions. The EPA has indicated that under the Water Act it will
proceed against violators of final permit limitations, and that even
where a construction deadline has not been met a company which
has proceeded expeditiously will probably not be subject to an en-
forcement action."' Such assurances provide little solace, however,
to corporate officials who, recognizing that their company will never
be able to comply, decide to forego installing control devices and to
continue in operation until ordered to shut down entirely. These
officials ought to be given guidance as to whether civil or criminal
penalties will be assessed at the point they become aware that the
operation is not in compliance, or only after they have received a
notice of violation, or perhaps only after they have received an ad-
ministrative compliance order.
107. 8 ENvIR. RE.-Current Dev. (BNA) 2013 (April 21, 1978). Since the civil penalties
are supposedly remedial, rather than punitive, it seems inconsistent for the EPA to forego
the bargaining leverage presented by the possibility of reducing past penalties. The EPA
apparently believes that the prospect of accumulating further penalties is a sufficient incen-
tive for prompt compliance and that an insistence of full payment of past penalties increases
the in terrorem effect of the penalty system.
108. 8 ENVIR. REP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 2016 (April 21, 1978).
109. See Manaster, Perspective-Early Thoughts on Prosecuting Polluters, 2 EcOL. L.Q.
471, 481 (1972).
110. 8 ENVIR. REP.-Current Dev. (BNA) 247-48 (June 10, 1977).
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V. CONCLUSION
The recent public pronouncements by the EPA regarding its fu-
ture enforcement strategies are welcome. Up to this time there had
been no consistent or comprehensive enforcement guidelines, thus
there had been no predictability for those who were directly effected
by the Air and Water Laws. While these new guidelines are still
limited, and while they are in some places vague and in other places
nonexistent, they at least begin to attempt to formulate a needed
comprehensive policy. Assuming that the EPA follows the new
guidelines, the goals of that Agency should be well served without
any serious erosion of the rights of entities affected by environmen-
tal laws.
It must be emphasized, however, that these guidelines are only a
first step toward a comprehensive enforcement policy. The guide-
lines should be expanded and refined until the EPA has fully expli-
cated its position regarding all possible sanctions contained in the
Air and Water Acts to permit attainment of a uniform, effective and
fair enforcement policy.
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